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Abstract 
Inefficiency in agricultural production is generally interpreted as waste in the use of production 
factors. We challenge this interpretation by providing an explanation for why apparent 
inefficiency may result from rational production decisions by farmers and demonstrating 
systematics in the inefficiency patterns amongst the production factors that lend support for 
this, i.e. the rational inefficiency hypothesis. Based on a multidirectional efficiency analysis of 
421 Swedish dairy farms and statistical analyses of the inefficiency patterns, we provide 
support for the existence of rational inefficiency. These findings have clear implications for 
policy schemes aiming at pushing farms towards the efficient production frontier. 
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1 Introduction 
Within the agricultural economics literature, estimation of technical efficiency (TE) is a 
common way of evaluating the performance of farms. Achieving technically efficient farm 
production is also a way of contributing to the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (Latruffe et al., 2017), as some of its objectives relate to the prosperity of farms, with 
CAP measures aimed at enabling increased agricultural productivity, optimal use of 
agricultural production factors and ensuring the living standard of farmers (Massot, 2016). The 
TE approach builds on a microeconomic model of the farm business. An efficient isoquant, or 
production possibility frontier, is estimated empirically based on best practice revealed in the 
available data and then the position of each farm business relative to this isoquant or frontier 
is determined (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005). Possible deviations from the isoquant (frontier) are 
considered inefficiency, indicating that smaller amounts of the production factors could be used 
to produce the current level of output (input orientation) or that the level of output could be 
increased given the current use of production factors (output orientation). Inefficiency in 
production thereby represents waste in either the use of production factors or the production of 
outputs. Applications of TE analysis have considered not only the level of inefficiency, but 
also the associations between TE and characteristics of farms and/or the policy environment in 
which farms operate. For instance, many recent papers have considered the relationships 
between TE and factors such as: agricultural subsidies (Latruffe and Nauges, 2013); differences 
in housing systems (e.g. Labajova et al., 2016); management routines and practices (e.g. 
Labajova et al., 2016; Rougoor et al., 1998; Hansson, 2008); management control (e.g. Trip et 
al., 2002; Manevska-Tasevska and Hansson, 2011); financial management (Davidova and 
Latruffe, 2007) and farmers’ personal characteristics (e.g. Puig-Junoy and Argiles, 2004; 
Galanopoulos et al., 2006). Through investigating associations between TE and various aspects 
of the farm and/or the policy environment in which it operates, such studies often ultimately 
aim at providing policy recommendations about measures that can help push farm businesses 
closer to the efficient isoquant (production possibility frontier), or at providing insights into 
how various policies prevent or improve the TE of farms. 
 
However, if the ultimate goal of most TE studies is to identify possibilities to reduce waste in 
the utilisation of production factors and/or to provide normative advice about how such waste 
may be reduced, the practical utility of those studies depends on the accuracy in the behavioural 
assumptions underlying the TE findings. Of particular importance for the present study is the 
more or less implicit assumption that inefficiency in the use of production factors can be 
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interpreted as waste and consequently that it is desirable to reduce inefficiency. However, this 
way of interpreting the observed deviations of firms from the efficient isoquant (or production 
possibility frontier) has previously been challenged in the literature. Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003) argued that what is considered inefficiency in firms’ use of production factors may 
indeed be the result of rational production choices. For instance, seemingly overconsuming 
certain production factors may in fact be a rational decision to buffer against future risk and 
uncertainty. Some slack in the utilisation of labour in particular may also be allowed, in order 
to make the firm more attractive to employees and thereby avoid future expenses associated 
with high personnel turnover. Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) therefore introduced the notion 
of rational inefficiency as an explanation for certain deviations from efficient levels of 
production. Asmild et al. (2013) explored the hypothesis of rational inefficiency among 
Canadian bank branches and found empirical support for the existence of such rational 
inefficiency among the branches studied.  
 
Despite numerous TE studies in agriculture, the hypothesis of rational inefficiency has so far 
not been explored in an agricultural setting. However, previous research has suggested that 
farmers are not driven solely by financial considerations, but rather by a set of both financial 
and non-financial values of the social and lifestyle type (e.g. Gasson, 1973; Willock et al., 
1999; Ferguson and Hansson, 2013). Howley (2015) found that such non-financial benefits  
can explain farmers’ behaviour across a wide range of activities. Exploring the rational 
inefficiency hypothesis in an agricultural setting would be highly relevant from a policy 
perspective, as understanding whether observed inefficiency on farms is an effect of rational 
behaviour from the farmers’ perspective would shed new light on the possibilities to push farms 
towards higher levels of efficiency by various policy measures. From a theoretical perspective, 
such an analysis would also further the current understanding of the conditions for farming by 
highlighting the type of considerations that may underlie farmers’ production decisions and 
how these are reflected in the observed efficiency outcomes. 
 
Accordingly, in this paper we move beyond the current literature related to TE in agricultural 
production, with the overarching aim of exploring the rational inefficiency hypothesis in the 
agricultural production setting. We do this in two steps within the context of dairy farming: 
First, we offer a theoretical explanation as to why dairy farms can be expected to be rationally 
inefficient, i.e. why observed inefficiency can indeed be an outcome of rational decision 
making. Second, we build on the approach by Asmild et al. (2013) and look for systematics in 
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patterns of inefficiency among the production factors, in order to empirically explore the 
possible existence of rational inefficiency in dairy production in Sweden. Investigating the 
rational inefficiency hypothesis in this way is especially appealing because it can be done using 
data available through sources such as the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN). The 
present investigation was based on the premise that farmers make rational production decisions 
and that some of these decisions cause observed deviations from the efficient isoquant (or 
production possibility frontier), which would be taken as inefficiency in conventional analyses 
of TE. 
 
Dairy farms make a particularly interesting case for exploring the rational inefficiency 
hypothesis within agriculture. On dairy farms, decisions related to the management and welfare 
of livestock kept for milk production can significantly affect the efficiency of the farm. 
McInerney (2004) and Lagerkvist et al. (2011) have suggested that livestock farmers (including 
dairy farmers) recognise two types of economic value from the management of their livestock: 
use values and non-use values. Use values relate to productivity and profitability type 
measures, while non-use values comprise all other values farmers derive from managing their 
livestock, and include considerations related to ethics in production, farmer self-image, the 
perceived rights of the animals and the perceived legitimacy of farm production. Recent studies 
have found empirical evidence that non-use values in animal welfare are important 
motivational factors underlying dairy farmers’ decision-making (Hansson and Lagerkvist, 
2016, 2015). Moreover, Hansson and Lagerkvist (2016) classified eight of the 10 most 
important values motivating dairy farmers’ decision making related to the well-being of their 
animals as being of the non-use type. In relation to the present study, those studies support an 
assumption that because of the existence of non-use values in animal welfare, some farmers 
might be reluctant to push their animals towards their maximal productivity and might be 
inclined, from an efficiency perspective, to overconsume certain production factors. In an 
efficiency setting, this counts as inefficiency, interpreted as waste, but may very well be an 
outcome of a rational decision by the farmer if they prioritise certain non-use values. This is 
exactly the issue explored in the present paper by combining these insights about use and non-
use values as motivational factors for farmers’ work related to their livestock with the notion 
of TE. 
 
The study is based on production data for Swedish dairy farms collected from the FADN, which 
is a detailed dataset encompassing information from farm income statements and balance 
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sheets and additional production data such as number of hours worked on the farm. If some 
inefficiency is indeed rational, we would expect some systematic patterns within the 
inefficiency. This, in turn, means that certain characteristics of the production system in this 
industry are typically not properly captured in conventional efficiency analyses and thus 
wrongly recorded as waste.  
 
The study contributes to the literature by offering an alternative interpretation of estimated 
inefficiency within agricultural production, providing an explanation for why inefficiency may 
be reported and exploring empirical evidence supporting the rational inefficiency hypothesis. 
 
The findings can be useful in two different ways: First, they may be of value to actors in 
agribusiness and to policy makers, by highlighting why advice and measures to push inefficient 
farms to the efficient isoquant (or production possibility frontier) may not be effective 
approaches for these farms if the inefficiency is in fact rational. Second, findings illustrating 
that economic production considerations may not be the only determinant of farmers’ 
behaviour, but rather farmers allow some production slack, in order to achieve something that 
is also valuable to them. This is especially interesting in light of the poor economic performance 
many farmers are currently experiencing and could indicate that this partly results from rational 
production decisions. 
 
2 Theoretical background: rationalising inefficiency in dairy farming 
Measuring farm performance in terms of TE means that a farm’s actual performance is 
compared against an efficient isoquant (or production possibility frontier). As defined in the 
influential paper by Farrell (1957), technical inefficiency measures the amount by which 
production could be increased given the observed level of production inputs (output-orientated 
measure) or by how much production inputs can be reduced given the observed level of output 
production (input-orientated measure). Technical efficiency is typically measured in the range 
[0;1] with 1 representing the maximum attainable efficiency. 
 
Livestock farming involves the use of animals as production factors. Farmers’ recognition of 
economic value in terms of both use values and non-use values (McInerney, 2004; Lagerkvist 
et al., 2011) related to the wellbeing of their animals can be expected to explain their provision 
of animal welfare (AW) (Lagerkvist et al., 2011). Economic value in this sense is defined as 
“a weighting that people place on something, and reflects the benefit (pleasure, satisfaction, 
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gain, virtue, advantage) – or what economists call ‘utility’ – that they gain from it” (McInerney, 
2004:5). Use values in AW represent the economic value farmers derive from recognising 
animals as production factors and is the economic value associated with treating the animals in 
such a way that they can produce. The rationale for sustaining a certain level of AW is then 
similar to the rationale of actions taken to maintain the productivity of any production factor. 
Non-use values represent any other economic value farmers derive from the welfare of the 
animal. These types of values may explain why farmers take actions to provide AW beyond 
the requirements imposed by productivity and profitability considerations. Lagerkvist et al. 
(2011) further developed the notion of non-use values in AW by defining it as consisting of 
five theoretically distinct types: Pure non-use values, existence values, bequest values, option 
values and paternalistic altruism.  
 
Improving AW on the farm can be expected to lead to higher levels of non-use values being 
realised. Non-use values are not readily measurable from farm income statements. As farmers 
nevertheless receive economic value from realising those non-use values, we argue that a 
decision to improve AW and realise higher levels of non-use values is the outcome of a rational 
decision-making process. Consequently, the presence of non-use values related to AW in dairy 
farmers’ decision making could explain why farmers might seemingly overconsume certain 
production inputs, as an outcome of rational decision making, in order to improve AW and 
thereby realise certain non-use values, but as a consequence appear technically inefficient. The 
presence of non-use values in AW implies the presence of two central decision parameters in 
farmers’ decisions about how to position their farms in production space: the level of non-use 
values (𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒) and the level of farm profit (𝜋) to produce. We assumed that each farmer 𝑓 
has an underlying (but unobservable) utility function 𝑈𝑓 = 𝑈𝑓(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑓 , 𝜋𝑓), which is strictly 
increasing in both of its arguments. Each farm’s technically efficient use of production factors 
and level of produced outputs can be determined from the production possibility set, which can 
be empirically estimated using the non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
framework, but which typically ignores the unobservable non-use values produced. Any 
deviations from the technically efficient vector of production factors, given the outputs 
produced, would be considered overconsumption of production factors in a general TE 
framework, where the presence of non-use values is ignored. However, following the above 
line of argument and considering farmers as rational, and thus utility-maximising in both non-
use values and profit, any deviations from the efficient isoquant (or production possibility 
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frontier) can be assumed to result from rational production decisions where utility is gained 
from production of non-use values, even if this means that profit is reduced. 
 
From a rational inefficiency perspective, we assumed here that the presence of non-use values 
of AW in dairy farmers’ decision making gives rise to certain systematic patterns within the 
inefficiency. From a input-orientated TE perspective, AW-improving measures can be 
expected to require more of some production inputs, but may reduce the need for other 
production inputs, for instance due to associated positive effects on animal health. However, it 
can be expected that, from a certain level, additional AW-improving measures will start 
reducing TE. If farmers apply AW-improving measures beyond this level, the rational reason 
for this would be the presence of non-use values in their decision making. Thus, assuming that 
decision making is rational, negative associations between AW-improving measures and TE 
can be taken as an indication of rational inefficiency. From an output-orientated TE 
perspective, the general interpretation is that production output can be increased given the 
current levels of production inputs. However, in the presence of non-use values in AW, one 
type of utility obtained from production is unobserved, implying that the actual output 
delivered is underestimated.  Furthermore, what is interpreted as under-production of outputs 
in a traditional TE analysis, when it comes to the use of animals in production may be due to 
farmers’ reluctance to push their animals towards their biological maximal production, due to 
possible adverse effects on non-use values. Thus, a conventional TE analysis would suggest 
that less efficient farms could become more efficient by adopting the AW practices of the most 
efficient farms. In practice, due to the presence of non-use values in AW, these farms may have 
chosen not to do so in order to maximise their utility (economic value). 
 
3 Method 
3.1 Multidirectional efficiency analysis 
In our analysis, we used multidirectional efficiency analysis (MEA) (Asmild et al., 2003, 
Bogetoft and Hougaard, 1999) to assess the variable-specific TE of each farm. The MEA 
approach has been used previously in the agricultural economics literature, e.g. by Labajova et 
al. (2016) to assess the production efficiency of a sample of Swedish pig farms and by Asmild 
et al. (2003) to assess production efficiency on Danish dairy farms. Compared with the more 
commonly used data envelopment analysis (DEA) employed by e.g. Charnes et al. (1978), 
MEA has the advantage that it permits assessment of TE in each production input and output 
and thus offers a more detailed analysis of production efficiency, which is especially relevant 
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in this study1. We based our analysis on farm accounting data, which meant that it was only 
possible to account for the use of production inputs at aggregated level on the farm: for 
instance, the amount of labour used in the dairy enterprise could not be distinguished within 
the total amount of labour used in the whole farm operation. This means that to correctly 
represent the studied farms, we needed to account also for the possibility that they produce 
other types of outputs from the production inputs recorded. In this setting, the more detailed 
analysis enabled by MEA was advantageous, because it allowed us to analyse separately the 
TE in production output from dairy, without confounding this with TE in the production of 
other outputs. For completeness, the TE in other types of production was included in the 
analyses, but was not interpreted in relation to AW. 
 
For estimation of MEA scores for the farms, we considered a set of 𝑛 farms (𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑛) that 
all use four production inputs 𝑥𝑗,𝑠(𝑗 = 1, … ,4) in the production of two outputs 𝑦𝑖,𝑠(𝑖 = 1,2) 
and assumed that production takes place under constant returns to scale. We then derived the 
relative variable-specific TE scores for each production input and output, using linear 
programming models as shown in equations 1 to 4.  
First, for each input 𝑗 = 1, … ,4 solve for each 𝐷𝑀𝑈 = (𝑥0, 𝑦0): 
𝑎𝑗
∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜆,𝑎𝑗  𝑎𝑗  s.t.  . 
∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑠 𝑥𝑗,𝑠  ≤  𝑎𝑗,0  
∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑠 𝑥−𝑗,𝑠  ≤  𝑥−𝑗,0       (1) 
∑ 𝜆𝑠 𝑠 𝑦𝑖,𝑠  ≥  𝑦𝑖,0  i = 1, 2  
𝜆𝑠 ≥ 0 
where (−𝑗) denotes all inputs except input 𝑗 and DMU denotes Decision-making unit (farms). 
Next, for each output 𝑖 = 1,2 solve for each 𝐷𝑀𝑈 = (𝑥0, 𝑦0): 
𝛼𝑗
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜆,𝛼𝑖  𝛼1            s.t. . 
∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑠 𝑥𝑗,𝑠  ≤  𝑥𝑗,0     j = 1, 2, 3, 4  
∑ 𝜆𝑠 𝑠 𝑦𝑖,𝑠  ≥  𝛼𝑖,0       
∑ 𝜆𝑠 𝑠 𝑦−𝑖,𝑠  ≥  𝑦−𝑖,0     (2) 
𝜆𝑠 ≥ 0 
where (−𝑖) denotes the other output besides output 𝑖. 
                                                     
1For comparison, the input-orientated DEA TE results are also presented. 
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Combining the solutions to the equations above results in an ideal reference point 
(𝑎1,0
∗ , … , 𝑎4,0
∗ , 𝛼1,0
∗ , 𝛼2,0
∗ ) for observation (𝑥0,  𝑦0).  
In the second step, use the ideal reference point for (𝑥0,  𝑦0) calculated in the first step to solve 
the following programme: 
𝛽0
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜆,𝛽0   𝛽0  s.t. 
∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑠 𝑥𝑗,𝑠  ≤  𝑥𝑗,0 −  𝛽0 (𝑥𝑗,0 −  𝑎𝑗,0
∗ ), 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, 4 (3) 
∑ 𝜆𝑠 𝑠 𝑦𝑖,𝑠  ≥  𝑦𝑖,0 + 𝛽0 (𝛼𝑖,0
∗ −  𝑦𝑖,0),         𝑖 = 1, 2             (4) 
𝜆𝑠 ≥ 0  
Finally, use the solution (𝜆 
∗,𝛽0 
∗ ) from equation 3 to determine the vector of relative variable-
specific MEA efficiencies for unit (𝑥0,  𝑦0) as: 
( 
𝑥1,0 − 𝛽0
∗(𝑥1,0 − 𝑎1,0
∗ )
𝑥1,0
, ... , 
𝑥4,0 − 𝛽0
∗(𝑥4,0 − 𝑎4,0
∗ )
𝑥4,0
, 
𝑦1,0
𝑦1,0 + 𝛽0
∗(𝛼1,0
∗ − 𝑦1,0)
, 
𝑦2,0
𝑦2,0 + 𝛽0
∗(𝛼2,0
∗ − 𝑦2,0)
 )  (5) 
 
3.2 Exploring rational inefficiency: Analytical framework 
In the present analysis, we explored the rational inefficiency hypothesis by investigating the 
patterns within inefficiencies in production inputs and outputs on the sample of dairy farms. In 
particular, we explored associations between TE, AW-improving measures and indicators of 
the actual levels of AW, in a two-step process. 
 
First we investigated, graphically and statistically, the relationships between the levels of AW-
improving measures and the TE, in order to determine whether some farmers apply potentially 
AW-improving measures to the extent that it reduces TE, and therefore potentially exhibit 
rational inefficiency by assigning relatively high importance to non-use values as opposed to 
use values. To determine this, for each comparison between an AW-improving measure and a 
TE score, we divided the resulting area into four quadrants based on the median value of the 
AW-improving measure and the median value of the TE score2. The farms located in the 
quadrant with relatively high levels of AW-improving measures while attaining relatively low 
levels of TE emerged as potentially being rationally inefficient (the Rational Inefficiency (RI) 
group). The farms which apply relatively low levels of AW-improving measures while 
attaining relatively high levels of TE emerged as potentially obtaining low utility from non-use 
                                                     
2The reason for using the medians to divide the two-dimensional space into four quadrants is that, if there is no 
relationship between the two dimensions, then there will be the same number of observations in each of the four 
quadrants (which in turn becomes the null hypothesis in the subsequent chi-square test, which does not require 
the assumption of a linear relationship between the two variables, unlike e.g. the correlation). 
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values, but high utility from profit (the Efficiency group). Farms with low TE and low levels 
of AW-improving measures simply appear inefficient (the Inefficiency group). Finally, farms 
with both high TE and high AW-improving measures were taken to be ‘multi-efficient’ (the 
Multi-efficiency group). Having many farms located in the Multi-efficiency group (and also in 
the Inefficiency group) would challenge the assumption of a trade-off between TE and AW-
improving measures, whereas over-representation of farms in the RI and the Efficiency groups 
would provide empirical evidence of this trade-off. We used chi-square tests to formally 
analyse whether the farms were equally distributed between the groups or whether there was 
an over-representation of farms on either diagonal: over-representation on the Multi-efficiency 
and Inefficiency diagonal would indicate that AW-improving measures and TE are 
complements, rather than substitutes, while over-representation on the RI and Efficiency 
diagonal would indicate that there is indeed a trade-off between the two. If the latter is the case, 
then the farms in the RI group apply AW-improving measures to a higher degree than is 
efficiency improving, which in turn can only be rationalised if this actually leads to higher AW 
and if the farmers assign value to this by having high non-use values of AW (in particular 
compared with the farmers in the Efficiency group). 
 
Second, for any over-representation on the RI and Efficiency diagonal, we then investigated 
whether what could be perceived as over-investment in AW-improving measures (at the 
expense of TE) is potentially rational in the sense that it improves actual AW. So, using t-tests, 
we analysed whether the farms belonging to the RI group had higher actual AW than the farms 
in the Efficiency group in particular (but also than the farms in the Multi-efficiency and 
Inefficiency groups). Higher actual AW in the RI group compared with the other groups was 
interpreted as a potentially rational explanation for their inefficiency, consisting of two parts: 
Choosing high AW measures at the expense of low efficiency can be rationalised by assigning 
higher weight to non-use values; and those non-use values could very well be related to AW if 
actual AW is higher in that group. 
 
3.3 Data 
For the analysis, we used farm-level production data for a set of specialist dairy farms, 
following the EU Commission typology for agricultural holdings (EU Commission Regulation, 
2008), obtained from the Swedish Farm Accounting Survey (FAS). That survey is carried out 
by Statistics Sweden on behalf of the Swedish Board of Agriculture and constitutes the Swedish 
input to the EU-wide FADN. In FAS, data are available for a sample of about 1000 Swedish 
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farms and are stratified according to farm size and geographical location. The panel is rotated, 
with about 10% of the participating farms replaced every year. The FAS data contain detailed 
production information on the farms, based on their accounting information. For the present 
analysis, we used data from 421 specialist dairy farms represented in FAS in 2013. From the 
FAS data, we defined four production inputs (labour, variable costs, fixed costs and assets) 
(Table 1). As in the FADN definitions of variables (European Commission, 2010), the labour 
input represents total hours of unpaid and paid labour engaged on the farm; variable costs 
comprise the total specific costs and overheads on the farm; fixed costs represent the 
accounting costs in terms of depreciation, rents and interests; and the asset value includes the 
total assets value of land, machinery, buildings, breeding and non-breeding livestock, and 
represents the opportunity cost of the capital. We also defined two production outputs (Table 
1): output 1 defined as the revenue from milk and beef production, and output 2 defined as the 
revenue from all other agricultural and diversified activities on the farm (as in Barnes et al. 
(2015)). Furthermore, based on the information in FAS, we derived one potentially AW-
improving measure, buildings cost per livestock unit (LU)3, assuming that higher costs are 
associated with higher levels of AW, and  two indicators of actual AW: revenue from culling 
of dairy cows (measured relative to the value of dairy cows) and veterinary costs per dairy cow. 
Animal welfare is a multidimensional construct, where one dimension relates to the functioning 
of the animal (for instance in terms of health and production) (von Keyserling, et al., 2009). 
Animal health problems lead to increased veterinary costs and health and production problems, 
such as impaired cow fertility, resulting in involuntary culling of dairy cows. In the type of 
accounting data used in this study, we were able to trace poor actual AW by these indicators 
on the grounds that poor AW would be associated with relatively higher rates of veterinary 
treatments and with relatively higher rates of culling. Higher levels of both indicators of actual 
AW can thus be considered to be associated with lower levels of actual AW. 
  
                                                     
3Based on the production data used in this study, we isolated two variables considered as AW-improving 
measures: building costs per livestock unit (LU) and pasture per LU. Thus, initially we also included in the 
analysis the variable accounting for pasture per LU. Findings (not shown but available from the authors upon 
request) of the chi-square tests used to formally analyse whether farms were equally distributed between the 
groups or whether there was over-representation of farms on the diagonals did not yield statistically significant 
results based on TE for the production factors. For TE for production outputs, the findings supported over-
representation of farms on the RI and Efficiency diagonal for TE in Output 1, thus suggesting a trade-off between 
TE and the AW-improving measure pasture per LU. However, because only one of the variables considered 
supported the RI hypothesis, this AW-improving measure was not further evaluated in this exploratory study of 
systematic patterns in production data. 
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Table 1: Description and descriptive statistics on variables used 
 Description  Unit Mean Std dev 
Inputs     
Variable costs Total amount of variable costs, including: total 
specific costs and farming overheads (supply 
costs linked to production, but not linked to a 
specific line of production) 
SEK* 3181665 3642511 
Fixed costs Total amount of fixed costs, including:  
depreciation, rents and interests  
SEK 1152102 1656106 
Assets Total value of assets in ownership, including: 
agricultural land, buildings, machinery and 
equipment, breeding and non-breeding livestock, 
and circulating capital 
SEK 11115457 11573519 
Labour Total amount of labour used for production hours 5965 4253 
Outputs     
Output 1 Total revenue obtained from milk and meat (beef 
and veal) production 
SEK 2887343 3857286 
Output 2 Total revenue obtained from: other agricultural 
production, entrepreneurial output (leased land, 
contract work, hiring equipment, tourism, etc.), 
and subsidies 
SEK 1804858 1724919 
AW-improving measure    
Building costs 
Total amount of building costs, normalised per  
livestock unit (LU) 
SEK/LU 44501 75475 
Indicators of actual AW    
Rate of culling   % 11.58 .09 
Veterinary costs  SEK/LU 279.00 202.67 
*10 SEK (Swedish krona) is equivalent to approximately 1.1 €; ** The number of livestock units is calculated 
following the definition of variables used in the FADN standard results. 
 
4 Results 
           4.1 Technical efficiency analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the combined input- and output-orientated MEA scores for the dairy 
farms in the sample, along with the input-orientated DEA scores for comparison, are presented 
in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Descriptive of multidirectional efficiency analysis and data envelopment analysis 
scores 
Variable Average score Std dev 
MEA scores 
Production inputs 
  
TE Variable costs 0.93 0.04 
TE Fixed costs 0.83 0.09 
TE Assets 0.81 0.09 
TE Labour 0.83 0.08 
Production outputs   
TE Output 1 0.86 0.13 
TE Output 2 0.79 0.17 
DEA score 
Input-oriented 
 
0.81 
 
0.11 
 
Among the production inputs, the highest level of TE was attained for input variable costs. For 
the production outputs, the highest level of TE was obtained for output 1 (revenue obtained 
from milk and meat). From this, it appears as though the farms are overconsuming, especially 
as regards the production inputs labour, fixed costs and assets. However, provided that the 
farmers are maximising utility, and thus base their production choices on rational decisions, 
these inputs may only appear to be overconsumed because they are in fact used to generate 
non-use values in AW.  
 
4.2  Exploring the rational inefficiency hypothesis: Analysis of the patterns of 
inefficiency 
We explored the rational inefficiency hypothesis by investigating the patterns within the 
estimated inefficiencies on the farms, based on the arguments presented in our analytical 
framework.  
 
4.2.1  Classifying farms into the RI group and the Efficiency group 
The levels of the AW-improving measure (building costs per LU) plotted against the TE of 
each of the inputs and outputs are shown in Figure 1. In each diagram, the farms are divided 
into four quadrants based on the median value of the AW-improving measure and of the TE 
measure. Farms located in the upper-left quadrant (Q1 in Figure 1) have higher levels of the 
AW-improving measure, but at the same time lower levels of TE; these were classified into the 
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RI group. Similarly, farms located in the lower-right quadrant (Q4 in Figure 1) have lower 
levels of the AW-improving measure, but also the higher levels of TE; these were classified 
into the Efficiency group. Farms located in quadrant Q2 have relatively high levels of the AW 
measure, but still succeed in attaining higher levels of TE (the Multi-efficiency group) and 
farms located in quadrant Q3 apply relatively lower levels of the AW-improving measure but 
still do not succeed in attaining higher levels of TE (the Inefficiency group). 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the animal welfare (AW)-improving measure building costs per LU,  
plotted against the TE of each input and output. The upper-left (Q1) quadrant represents the 
Rational Efficiency (RI) group, Q2 the Multi-efficiency group, Q3 the Inefficiency group and 
the lower-right (Q4) quadrant the Efficiency group.   
 
The numbers of farms located in each of the different groups (for each of the different TE 
scores) are presented in Table 3, together with the results of the chi-square tests used to  analyse 
whether farms were equally distributed across the groups (the null hypothesis in the test) or 
not. The chi-square test was statistically significant in all cases, which shows that there was an 
over-representation in some of the groups, such that there was no independence between having 
high compared with low levels of the AW-improving measure and having high compared with 
low TE. Specifically, we found over-representation of farms located on the diagonal containing 
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the Rational Inefficiency group and the Efficiency group. This provides empirical evidence of 
a trade-off between the AW-improving measure in terms of building costs per LU and TE. 
There were also many farms located in the quadrant with the higher levels of the AW-
improving measure but with low levels of TE, which indicates that some farms may in fact 
sacrifice TE for AW, which could be a rational decision due to non-use values in AW. 
Therefore we next analysed whether the farms in the RI group actually achieve higher levels 
of actual AW. 
Table 3: Distribution of farms across the groups. Results from Chi-square tests  
 TE Variable costs   TE Fixed costs 
AW: building 
costs/LU 
Low High Total 
AW : building 
costs/LU 
Low High Total 
High  116  97 212 High 140 73 210 
Low 96 112  209 Low 70 138 211 
Total 212 209 421 Total 210 211 421 
Pearson chi2  2.9044   Pearson chi2 43.3038   
Pr  0.088   Pr 0.000   
 TE Assets  TE Labour 
AW: building 
costs/LU 
Low High Total 
AW: building 
costs/LU 
Low  High  Total 
High  140 73 212 High 122 91 209 
Low 72 136 209 Low 87 121 212 
Total 212 209 421 Total 209 212 421 
Pearson chi2: 40.7481   Pearson chi2: 10.0486   
Pr 0.000   Pr 0.000   
 TE Output 1   TE Output 2 
AW: building 
costs/LU 
Low High Total 
AW: building 
costs/LU 
Low High Total 
High 119 94 210 High 123 90 210 
Low 91 117 211 Low 87 121 211 
Total 210 211 421 Total 210 211 421 
Pearson chi2: 6.1819   Pearson chi2: 10.6681   
Pr 0.013   Pr 0.001   
Note: Low if technical efficiency (TE) and animal welfare (AW) measure < 50th percentile; High if TE and AW measure >= 
50th percentile. The group: TE=1ow and AW=high represents RI group; TE=high and AW=1ow represents Efficiency group; 
TE=1ow and AW=low represents Inefficiency group; and TE=high and AW=high represents Multi-efficiency group.  
 
4.2.2  Comparison of differences in indicators of actual AW between the RI group and 
the non-RI groups 
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To test the hypothesis that the mean level of actual AW differs between the RI group and the 
other groups of farms, two-sample t-tests for unpaired data were used. A variance comparison 
test suggested unequal variance among the groups, and therefore the Satterthwaite and the 
Welch approximations for unequal variances were used (Ruxton, 2006). The average levels of 
the indicators of actual AW in the RI group and in the Efficiency group are shown in Table 4. 
As is evident from the values in Table 4, the RI group mostly had significantly higher values 
of the indicators of actual AW compared with the Efficiency group. These higher levels of 
actual AW in the RI group indicate that the farms in the RI group, as a consequence of choosing 
higher levels of the potentially AW-improving measure, but at the expense of TE, actually 
achieve higher levels of AW. This can be taken as an indication of the existence of rational 
inefficiency in this group. Thus this empirical evidence supports the existence of rational 
inefficiency. 
 
For comparison, we also investigated differences in indicators of actual AW between the RI 
group and the Multi-efficiency group. The findings suggested that the indicators of the actual 
level of AW were significantly more favourable in the RI group compared with the Multi-
efficiency group in all cases when actual AW was indicated by rate of culling (Table 5). When 
indicating actual AW by veterinary costs in SEK/LU the findings were not equally clear, with 
significant evidence of higher AW in four cases and lower AW in two. Taken together, in most 
cases the findings in Table 5 indicate significantly better AW in the RI group than in the Multi-
efficiency group. This implies that while the RI group sacrifices in terms of TE compared with 
the Multi-efficiency group, it gains in terms of attaining higher levels of actual AW. 
 
It was found that the RI group also achieves significantly more favourable levels of actual AW 
compared with the Inefficiency group, when considering AW in terms of rate of culling (Table 
6). This confirms the finding above that the observed inefficiency in the RI group is 
compensated for by higher levels of actual AW and lends further support to the suggestion that 
the position of the RI group is due to rational production considerations. When considering 
actual AW in terms of veterinary costs in SEK/LU, the findings based on the DEA TE scores 
suggested more favourable actual AW in the Inefficiency group. However, the MEA scores, 
which allow more detailed analysis of production patterns, indicated significantly more 
favourable AW for the RI group in two cases and insignificant results in three cases. Thus, 
based on the more detailed MEA analysis, there is some support for the claim that the RI group 
succeeds in achieving higher levels of actual AW compared with the Inefficient group. 
19 
 
Table 4: Comparison of indicators of actual animal welfare (AW) between the Rational 
Inefficiency group and the Efficiency group  
AW indicator: Rate of culling in % 
RI group Efficiency group 
Mean rate      
of culling,          
RI group 
Mean rate        
of culling, 
Efficiency group 
t-testa,b 
Support for 
RI hypothesis 
High build. costs & 
low TE VC  
Low build costs & 
high TE VC   
9.06 12.56 -33.65*** Yes  
High build. costs & 
low TE FC  
Low build. costs & 
high TE FC   
9.93 11.85 -22.97*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Assets  
Low build. costs & 
high TE Assets  
10.01 12.33 -25.67*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Labour  
Low build. costs & 
high TE Labour  
9.82 11.52 -18.07*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Output 1 
Low build. costs & 
high TE Output 1 
9.90 12.09 -21.55*** Yes 
High build. Costs & 
low TE Output 2 
Low build. costs & 
high TE Output 2 
9.47 12.67 -29.52*** Yes 
Low build. costs  & 
high TE DEA  
Low build. costs & 
high TE DEA   
9.56 12.57 -29.34*** Yes 
AW indicator: Veterinary costs in SEK/LU 
RI-group Efficiency-group 
Mean vet costs           
RI group 
Mean vet costs 
Efficiency group 
t-testa, b 
Support for 
RI hypothesis 
High build. costs & 
low TE VC  
Low build. costs & 
high TE VC   
279.37 283.73 -1.64* Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE FC  
Low build. costs & 
high TE FC    
268.43 285.04 -7.26*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Assets  
Low build. costs & 
high TE Assets  
272.81 276.39 -1.61* Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Labour  
Low build. costs & 
high TE Labour  
282.32 283.64 -0.51 - 
High build. costs & 
low Output 1 
Low build. costs & 
high Output 1 
266.81 291.40 -8.67*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low Output 2  
Low build. costs & 
high Output 2 
287.55 288.06 -0.20 - 
High build. costs & 
low TE DEA  
Low build. costs & 
high TE DEA   
272.50 298.15 -9.17*** Yes 
aWelch and Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom; b Pr(T<t): * = 0.05; **=0.01; ***=0.001; high is 
values >= than the 50th percentile; low is values < than the 50th percentile; TE = technical efficiency, DEA = data 
envelopment analysis, VC = variable costs, FC = fixed costs.    
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Table 5: Comparison of indicators of actual animal welfare (AW) between the Rational 
Inefficiency group and the Multi-efficiency group  
AW indicator: Rate of culling in % 
RI group 
Multi-efficiency 
group 
Mean rate of 
culling  
RI group 
Mean rate of cull. 
Multi-eff. group t-test
a,b 
Support for 
RI ypothesis 
High build. costs &   
low TE VC 
High build. costs & 
high TE VC   
9.06 12.68 -40.63*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE FC  
High build. costs & 
high TE FC   
9.93 12.18 -18.71*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Assets  
High build. costs & 
high TE Assets  
10.01 11.99 -17.15*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Labour  
High build. costs & 
high TE Labour  
9.82 11.87 -21.31*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low Output 1  
High build. costs & 
high Output 1 
9.90 11.73 -20.42*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low Output 2  
High build. costs & 
high Output 2  
9.47 12.36 -31.51*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE DEA  
High build. costs & 
high TE DEA   
9.56 12.05 -27.55*** Yes 
AW indicator: Veterinary costs in SEK/LU 
RI group 
Multi-efficiency 
group 
Mean vet costs 
RI group 
Mean vet costs 
Multi-eff. group 
t-testa,b 
Support for 
RI ypothesis 
High build. &        
low TE VC  
High build. costs & 
high TE VC   
279.37 273.85 2.09** No 
High build. &         
low TE FC  
High build. costs & 
high TE FC    
268.43 288.59 -6.81*** Yes 
High build. &       
low TE Assets  
High build. costs & 
high TE Assets  
272.81 283.71 -3.86*** Yes 
High build. &       
low TE Labour  
High build. costs & 
high TE Labour  
282.32 269.53 4.76*** No 
High build. &       
low TE Output 1 
High build. costs & 
high Output 1 
266.81 288.44 -8.18*** Yes 
High build. &       
low TE Output 2 
High build. costs & 
high Output 2  
287.54 263.38 9.09*** No 
High build. costs  & 
low TE DEA  
High build. costs & 
high TE DEA   
272.50 281.21 -3.31*** Yes 
aWelch-Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom; b Pr(T<t): * = 0.05; **=0.01; ***=0.001; high is for 
values >= than the 50th percentile; low is for values < than the 50th percentile; TE = technical efficiency, DEA = 
data envelopment analysis, VC = variable costs, FC = fixed costs.   
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Table 6: Comparison of indicators of actual animal welfare (AW) between the Rational 
Inefficiency group and the Inefficiency group 
AW indicator: Rate of culling in % 
RI group Inefficiency group 
Mean rate of 
culling             
RI group 
Mean rate of 
culling            
Ineff. group 
t-testa 
Support for 
RI hypothesis 
High build. &  
low TE VC  
Low build. costs & 
low TE VC   9.06 12.36 -24.84*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE FC  
Low build. costs &  
low TE FC   
9.93 .1367 -22.36*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Assets  
Low build. costs &  
low TE Assets  
10.01 12.73 -18.98*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Labour  
Low build. costs &  
low TE Labour  
9.82 13.77 -28.48*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Output 1 
Low build. costs &  
low TE Output 1 
9.90 12.95 -21.51*** Yes 
High build. costs &  
low TE Output 2 
Low build. costs &  
low TE Output 2 
9.47 12.19 -22.59*** Yes 
High build. &  
low TE DEA  
Low build. costs &  
low TE DEA   
9.56 12.33 -19.35*** Yes 
AW indicator: Veterinary costs in SEK/LU 
RI group Inefficiency group 
Mean vet costs 
RI group 
Mean vet costs 
Ineff. group 
t-testa, b 
Support for 
RI hypothesis 
High build. costs & 
low TE VC  
Low build. costs & 
low TE VC   
279.37 278.30 0.28 - 
High build. costs & 
low TE FC  
Low build. costs & 
low TE FC   
268.43 274.26 -1.44* Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Assets  
Low build. costs & 
low TE Assets  
272.81 290.66 -4.04*** Yes 
High build. costs & 
low TE Labour  
Low build. costs & 
low TE Labour  
282.32 278.28 1.15 - 
High build. costs & 
low TE Output 1 
Low build. costs & 
low TE Output 1 
266.81 268.48 -0.51 - 
High build. costs & 
low TE Output 2 
Low build. costs & 
low TE Output 2  
287.54 271.33 4.21*** No 
High build. &  
low TE DEA  
Low build. costs & 
low TE DEA   
272.50 255.70 4.42*** No 
aWelch's-Satterthwaite's approximations for the degree of freedom; b Pr(T<t): * = 0.05; **=0.01; ***=0.001; high is 
for values >= than the 50th percentile; low is for values < than the 50th percentile; TE = technical efficiency, DEA 
= data envelopment analysis, VC = variable costs, FC = fixed costs.    
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
Through this study, we made a novel contribution to the literature by exploring the rational 
inefficiency hypothesis of Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) in an agricultural setting, specifically 
Swedish dairy farms. We did this in two steps:  First, we introduced a theoretical explanation 
of why there may be rational inefficiency in dairy farming, building on farmers’ possible 
recognition of non-use values (McInerney, 2004; Lagerkvist et al., 2011) as motivational 
factors in farmers’ decisions related to the welfare of their livestock. Second, we explored the 
patterns of inefficiencies, based on observed production data, in order to find empirical 
evidence of the existence of rational inefficiency among dairy farms in Sweden.  
 
Our two-stage empirical analysis provided statistically significant empirical evidence of a 
trade-off between an AW-improving measure (building costs per LU) and TE. When we plotted 
the level of the AW-improving measure against the various TE scores, we found an indication 
of a negative relationship between the two variables. This was further supported by the 
statistical tests, which showed significant over-representation of farms in the two quadrants on 
the diagonal of the diagrams supporting existence of such a trade-off. Furthermore, our 
empirical findings showed that the farms that we classified as the RI group score significantly 
more favourably on indicators of actual AW (measured in terms of rate of culling and 
veterinary costs in SEK/LU) compared with the farms that we classified as the Efficiency 
group. With some exceptions, the RI group also generally score significantly higher on the 
indicators of actual AW compared with the Multi-Efficiency group, or compared with 
Inefficient group. The analysis based on MEA offered a more detailed assessment of the 
relationships between TE and indicators of actual AW compared with the analysis based on 
DEA. Moreover, the use of MEA enabled us to study the TE in the output from dairy production 
separated from the TE in output from other types of production on the farms (output 2), which 
was desirable for the purposes of this study. In most cases the analyses based on MEA produced 
the same type of support for the RI hypothesis as the analyses based on DEA. However, there 
was one notable exception: when we compared the level of actual AW in the RI group to that 
in the Inefficiency group, the analysis based on DEA contradicted the RI hypothesis, while the 
analysis based on MEA supported the RI hypothesis or gave non-significant differences (Table 
6). A reason for this may be the aggregated nature of the DEA analysis, where efficiency effects 
of all production inputs and outputs are jointly analysed, including output 2 which is not really 
related to AW, but has to be included in the analysis to completely represent all output produced 
from the inputs used. 
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Taken together, our explorative analyses of the patterns of inefficiency indicate that farms 
which apply relatively high levels of the AW-improving measure considered, but at the same 
time attain lower levels of TE, generally report higher levels of indicators of actual AW. This 
holds especially when comparing the RI group with the Efficiency group, but also when 
comparing the RI group with the Multi-efficiency group. The findings thus suggest that the RI 
group, while at first glance appearing inefficient, succeeds in attaining higher levels of AW. 
Provided that farmers obtain utility both from the non-use values in AW and from profit, this 
indicates that the total utility obtained by the RI group consists to a higher degree of non-use 
values, and to a lower degree of profit. Assuming that all farmers make rational decisions, the 
positioning of the RI group compared with the Efficiency group is thus not due to bad 
production choices, but to the realisation of higher AW and thus potentially higher non-use 
values in AW. This supports the idea of the existence of rational inefficiency. The findings thus 
indicate that what may appear to be inefficiency in production may instead result from rational 
production decisions made by the farmers. Efficiency studies should explore the possibility of 
such interpretation of inefficiency of farms, in order to avoid misinterpreting deviations from 
the efficient isoquant or from the production possibility frontier as resulting from poor 
management. 
 
The emprical support for the existence of rational inefficiency in dairy farming found in this 
explorative study has implications for both public agricultural policies, such as the CAP, and 
private policy initiatives such as agricultural advice given by the advisory services. In 
particular, public and private policy measures that are designed to reduce inefficiency in 
agricultural production may not be effective because, while being based on the assumption that 
reducing inefficiency in the use of production factors is desirable by farmers, it may not be 
perceived as attractive by all farmers. Instead, for farmers of the type in the RI group such a 
policy may even reduce their total utility and may be perceived by the farmers as 
counterproductive. Measures designed to improve TE in farming should be targeted instead at 
farms of the type in the Inefficiency group, since unlike in the RI group their inefficiency seem 
to result from poor production decisions and not rational production decisions. 
 
An important task for future research is to continue to explore the rational inefficiency 
hypothesis. In particular, future research should explore the possible existence of rational 
inefficiency among other types of farms. Previous research has found that farmers’ attachment 
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to their animals may depend on the type of animals they keep and on the purpose for keeping 
these animals (Bock et al., 2007). As level of attachment may affect how animals are treated, 
this implies that farmers’ motivation for treating their animals well may be affected by the type 
of species they keep. This in turn can affect the importance of non-use values in farmers’ 
production decisions. Therefore, our findings cannot be readily generalised to other types of 
livestock producers. Future research should therefore explore the rational inefficiency 
hypothesis for other types of livestock farms. It should also explore the existence of rational 
inefficiency among other types of farms, such as arable farms, and develop theoretical 
explanations as to why there may be rational inefficiency among these farms. 
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